Formations and manoeuvre in ancient and medieval armies

[mmcv]

Something I've been thinking a bit about lately (in relation to wargame rules, as you do...) is just how much formations and manoeuvres played a role in ancient battles. Obviously, this is a pretty broad period with a lot of variety, so I'm generally thinking about the "minimal" and "maximum" abilities of armies in these periods. While information from the 17th Century onwards is a bit more comprehensive, it can be hard to discern for earlier periods.

Talking here mostly of western/near eastern armies with a core of infantry and some lighter troops and cavalry and mostly focused on infantry tactics.

As best I can tell, most armies would march in a column in their order of battle to where they want their line to be, turn to face the enemy and have at it, with some lighter troops skirmishing around the place and maybe some horse boys turning up the flanks. This seems to be the basic ability most armies could master. Some may be able to do this as smaller subdivisions of the larger army then come together when needed, or mass up in a denser formation or wedge.

Armies with a bit more training could implement some changes in density while in that line (open order, closed order, shieldwall, phalanx, etc) and maybe form back into column and move somewhere else if required, or shake out the line a bit and move forward or back in line.

A few very well-trained ones could implement countermarches and feigned retreats from that line.


What I'm curious about is if anyone knows of any more advanced maneuver or drill used in ancient or medieval armies?

Wheeling is one that particularly stands out. Many ancient wargaming rules include it, but it's not something I've come across in my reading as being implemented, at least not as forming line from column by wheeling or wheeling while already in line. Presumably some form of wheeling while marching in column was done as otherwise marching in columns could have caused some serious traffic jams.

[Ithoriel]

Roman armies of the Late Republic and, at least, Early to Mid Empire could form orbis, testudo and also cycle ranks to give troops a breather.

Orbis is basically hollow square, as far as I can tell from what I've read.

The sand of the desert is sodden red, --
Red with the wreck of a square that broke; --
The ballista's jammed and the Tribune dead,
And the regiment blind with dust and smoke.
The river of death has brimmed his banks,
And Rome is far, and Honour a name,
But a bloodied centurion rallies the ranks:
'Close up! Close up! In the emperor's name!'

Testudo is the well known formation of locked shields all round and overhead used to approach places and enemies well armed with missiles.

And we have no idea how the exchange of ranks worked, presumably because it was so well known at the time that it wasn't worth detailing.

The quincunx formation of the triplex acies is also a matter of conjecture. Was it used to manoeuvre into position but units then closed up? Did the princeps wait until islands of hastati were engaged then charge in to fill the gaps? We have no real idea.

Despite the theoretical flexibility of the Roman army they were still usually deployed like clockwork mice - point them in the right direction, wind them up, let them go!

[pierre the shy]

Roman armies of the Late Republic and, at least, Early to Mid Empire could form orbis, testudo and also cycle ranks to give troops a breather.

Orbis is basically hollow square, as far as I can tell from what I've read.

The sand of the desert is sodden red, --
Red with the wreck of a square that broke; --
The ballista's jammed and the Tribune dead,
And the regiment blind with dust and smoke.
The river of death has brimmed his banks,
And Rome is far, and Honour a name,
But a bloodied centurion rallies the ranks:
'Close up! Close up! In the emperor's name!'

Testudo is the well known formation of locked shields all round and overhead used to approach places and enemies well armed with missiles.

And we have no idea how the exchange of ranks worked, presumably because it was so well known at the time that it wasn't worth detailing.

The quincunx formation of the triplex acies is also a matter of conjecture. Was it used to manoeuvre into position but units then closed up? Did the princeps wait until islands of hastati were engaged then charge in to fill the gaps? We have no real idea.

Despite the theoretical flexibility of the Roman army they were still usually deployed like clockwork mice - point them in the right direction, wind them up, let them go!

Didn't realise that Sir Henry Newbolt translated his poem from the the original Latin version of the Vitaï Lampada Mike!     

[Ithoriel]

Plagiarism is the sincerest form of flattery, Peter.

Really ought to have been cohort or legion rather than regiment - my bad.

[Chris Pringle]

I'm with Clausewitz: all an ancient/medieval commander can really control is how to line up his army, whether to attack or await the enemy's attack, and (if super-sophisticated) when and where to commit a small reserve. The very occasional more capable army (eg, Mongols?) is just an exception to prove the rule.

See my blog post here:
https://bloodybigbattles.blogspot.com/2016/04/airing-some-prejudices-on-one.html
which actually originally derived from a debate on this very forum:
https://www.pendrakenforum.co.uk/index.php/topic,11416.0.html

[flamingpig0]

I suspect that ancient battles were much less organised and the troops far more tentative than  rule writers would have us believe.

[mmcv]

Roman armies of the Late Republic and, at least, Early to Mid Empire could form orbis, testudo and also cycle ranks to give troops a breather.

...
 
Despite the theoretical flexibility of the Roman army they were still usually deployed like clockwork mice - point them in the right direction, wind them up, let them go!

I read an interesting theory that the Romans would arrange their men in a checkerboard rather than the more common depiction of entire cohorts on a checkerboard. That way the enemy would be drawn into the gaps individually and surrounded and killed. Opening and closing lines, extending and contracting and cycling all seem to be feasible to Roman armies.and possibly a few other well drilled ones. Orbis is interesting, I often wonder how much of that was "this is what we meant all along" and how much was just the natural contraction as they got surrounded. 

I'm with Clausewitz: all an ancient/medieval commander can really control is how to line up his army, whether to attack or await the enemy's attack, and (if super-sophisticated) when and where to commit a small reserve. The very occasional more capable army (eg, Mongols?) is just an exception to prove the rule.

See my blog post here:
https://bloodybigbattles.blogspot.com/2016/04/airing-some-prejudices-on-one.html
which actually originally derived from a debate on this very forum:
https://www.pendrakenforum.co.uk/index.php/topic,11416.0.html

Yes I remember this discussion. A lot of the maneuver happened before the battle was joined, but as you say once engaged it was mostly about committing resources and trying to fill your own gaps while exploiting the enemy's.

I suspect that ancient battles were much less organised and the troops far more tentative than  rule writers would have us believe.

Agreed. I've been working on a number of my own rules and I'm trying to capture the flavour of different periods and armies (rather than a one size fits all that many pre gunpowder rules do) and model the command and control of different ways armies approached organising the chaos.

Currently trying to refine the ways different armies and units can move about. I had carried over the movement from my Feudal Japanese rules, but they behave quite differently and it doesn't translate the same way to more linear formations.

[Ithoriel]

I suspect that ancient battles were much less organised and the troops far more tentative than  rule writers would have us believe.

I imagine the ratio of those trying to kill versus those trying not to get killed went up substantially as training, discipline, morale and equipment improved.

The reason reluctant Sassanid levies don't fare well against veteran Legionaries isn't just down to rule writing bias

I read an interesting theory that the Romans would arrange their men in a checkerboard rather than the more common depiction of entire cohorts on a checkerboard. That way the enemy would be drawn into the gaps individually and surrounded and killed.

I find it hard to believe in chequerboard formations of any sort once in contact. Deliberately making your front rank outnumbered makes no sort of sense to me.

But as others are saying much of generalship was choosing the ground to fight on, arranging your troops before battle commenced and persuading your enemy to stay and fight.

That said active generals could influence the battle by their actions. Grabbing a rear-rankers shield, pushing your way to the front yelling,"Open your ranks! give yourselves room to fight!" or drawing a sword and yelling,"Follow me!" or simply standing firm and bellowing,"Will you go home and tell your fellows you left your general in the hands of the enemy?" Of course, less courageous generals could influence the course of a battle, hung in the balance, by taking a fast horse (or chariot) and high-tailing it with their bodyguard!

One of the many reasons I like Strength & Honour as a rule set is that manoeuvre is difficult and risks passing the tempo of the battle to the other side if it fails.

[Gwydion]

I wonder how many soldiers heard a General's exhortations in the heat of battle?

Forget the noise of battle, which was no doubt intense even without firearms, Lt Col Dave Grossman suggests (possible caveats here given some of his use of research in commercial work with the US Military and Law Enforcement) that when heart rates go over c150 beats per minute which is not uncommon in combat situations, the effects of hormones on the body can cause tunnel vision and loss of peripheral awareness and auditory exclusion. This seriously degrades the ability of soldiers in close quarter combat to even realise they are being encouraged, far less respond positively.

We like the stories of the heroic actions of leaders in combat and their rousing entreaties, but probably the best leadership was being the guy killing people in the front line with a small coterie of hearth troops about him (medieval period and 'barbarian' warfare) or the general who stayed calm and well back from the front line with the uncommitted reserve. That is the only position of choice in this era (perhaps any pre radio era?).

Pre battle training obviously helped prepare soldiers to do the best thing in the actual event, but how much larger control than local 'unit' level leadership had a positive effect once battle was joined feels decidedly moot to me.