Sealion 2.0

Started by sebigboss79, 16 December 2013, 10:33:30 PM

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sebigboss79

Greetings my fellow Pendrakens. I would like to revive above topic with some fresh insights and the desire to actually write a book about the potential Operation Sealion.

First up front:


  • Even IF Sealion had been 100 % successful there is no way Germany can win the war.

  • German armed forces have seen nothing but success thus moral will be high.

  • According to my current knowledge Luftwaffe and RAF had gone into a war of attrition - which the Germans would have won if they had kept up the pressure.
    Luftwaffe and RAF had advantages over the opponent in SOME areas which imho were compensated so both were fighting an even battle.


In order to succeed:

1. RAF needs to be moved out of the picture

The pressure must be upheld untill 11th Fightergroup is withdrawn north to conserve whatever strength is left.
-> This leaves airspace free to German Bombers, particularly the Ju87s to pinpoint and eliminate threats to both airpower and the invasion.

2. The Royal Navy must be occupied elsewhere

It was decided to sacrifice the remaining pocket battleships and a Heavy Cruiser in the Atlantic, drawing sufficient RN units out while the Italians would keep forces in the Med occupied.
Diversionary attacks (Herbsreise for example) shlould split whatever seapower was left.
Luftwaffe attacks and sinks enemy shipping.

-> It is unfathomable why any major units should have been committed to counter the invasion. There were almost 40 Destroyers available to RN just in the anticipated invasion area. Removing this threat is near impossible until the actual invasion.
-> Drawing RN units away is not a one way ticket. What if RN simply refuses to commit? What if heavy units are withdrawn and light cruisers and destroyers are left to fight alone? Actually a destroyer flotilla would pose a threat to the invasion that Luftwaffe must deal with. This again draws them away from preparing the invasion and assisting it. The only way would be to commit every Stuka to guard the invasion convoy. Impossible at night and even in brought daylight the record of Luftwaffe vs RN was clearly tilted towards the sea.

-> This brings up another issue. About 40 U Boats were available to attack the RN and to guard the convoy. The rest is too big to be of any use in the channel and its approaches.
-> Protecting the invasion with extensive minefields in combination with submarines and aerial dominance is the only way this can be pulled of. Bringing the first wave over is not an issue. Bringing second wave, reinforcements AND most of all supplies over is the problem.


3. Airborne attacks

Crete has lead Hitler to believe airborne troops are too vulnerable to be of operational use. Churchill had the opposite opinion. The airborne troops were employed to take Dover and Folkestone. How 800 - 1000 men would have succeeded in taking Dover is a secret German general staff has a monopoly on.

-> Airborne attack must be moved from tactical to strategic use. German paratroopers were a crack outfit, highly motivated and particularly indoctrinated. Thus they fight and die. It is admitted that key points need to be take in order for the invasion to succeed. This includes Dover, Folkestone, Ramsgate and/or Brighton/Bexhill etc. Further a bridgehead in the flank of the first STOP Line must be taken and held.

->-> My first recommendation is a totally different approach to the airborne attack. Increase its scale and let it make the way for a smaller first wave but with increased equipment and supplies.
->-> This leads to another change in the battleplan. Airborne troops take and hold at least two airfields (ca. 2 - 3am) untill engineers can re-open them. This is the key! This attack must come as a total surprise and own airpower must be stationed on British soil ASAP! Even at best speed the first counter attack cannot be organised untill dawn - exactly when the seaborne invasion takes place and therefore reduces the heat on the paratroopers.

PROBLEM: Availability of air transport! - I need figures on this but I have learned that the prime air transport (JU52) was in short supply after Crete. Sufficient transport capacity is mandatory for this alternate battleplan.



4. The initial British counter attack

No matter which approach is taken a different plan of attack and with dominance of the air the game is much more even, possibly tilting the scale so far that the Whermacht can actually pull this off. Any counterattack will be met by a massive airpower that is stationed on British soil. Thus longer loitering time and therefore tighter control of the air.

Luftwaffe fighters must bear the brunt of rejuvenated RAF. While "every Tigermoth available" is not really doing any good (remember increased supplies and equipment) against an enemy that has their own AA defense established the ground forces will put up quite a fight. The Royal Army will - initially - be the only thing between the Germans and victory. Very quickly the British will run short of options against a superior fighting force in the field. This implies the RN needs to be kept busy and under pressure. Difficult but under the right circumstances more than doable.It will take at least untill the afternoon of S-day for the major part of the anti-invasion fleet to set sail. And with the number of threats it will take more than a day or two to arrive and do something about the invasion. I will look at the role of RN next.


5. The RN
With the first wave on shore the RN must immediately lock the beaches. With airfields in German control this will reduce but not dry up supplies. With Luftwaffe stationed on british soil AND German coastal artillery on both sides (it was planned to station some serious firepower in Dover) the RN will pay a terrible price to eliminate the invasion fleet. While it must not be neglected the invasion fleet is crucial for trade and supply within Europe (eg Rhinebarges) it can be assumed that RN will not fight and die a heroe's death. There will be the point when Admirality withdraws its surface fleet.

Interestingly a memo from September 4 1940 states Admiralities concern whether they could prevent or interfere with a German invasion. I am currently looking to get a copy of this memo, any help is appreciated. References to it can be found in a  book I am also looking for - so far without success.



6. The use of Gas

As stated above the options will run short quite fast and there have been musings about "having every intention to use gas". How might a WW1 veteran have reacted to that when his own airforce dominates the sky and his troops are establishing a beachhead?
As of 1940 Hitler had on two occasions explicitly forbidden to retaliate with gas against two incidents during the Polish campaign. Both have been minor incidents but due to the "red line" being crossed Hitler was called upon to make the decision to retaliate in kind. On at least one occasion he declined. Rumour has it the Bohemian Private had been furious about the intentionof using gas!

I find it questionable that Churchill would have ultimately supported this decision. All he could have gained was some time with the potential of a gas war he has no means to win.



The discussion should be impartial and non political. If possible please reference your opinion. In the original setup Hitler had a small window of opportunity. With the right changes this window can be widened and moreover I believe Sealion can succeed under the right circumstances. I highly doubt the 1974 Sandhurst wargame. Firstly it assumes the Germans attempt Sealion without Air Dominance and partial control of the sea. Not even Hotler was THAT thick. Secondly I find no reference in said wargame to accomodate for the shortage of equipment on British side and the morale boost the Germans had. Thirdly the original plan of Sealion is less than ideal. It can be assumed that improvisation would continue on German side and a lot of unconventional operations would take place on either side.

As stated I would like to write an actual book about the possibilities to make this operation a success.

PatG

Well my former step father was in the occupied Netherlands when the Germans where trying out their ersatz landing craft - they were utter sh*te.  Sealion as planned was unworkable as has been discussed many times before so let's leave that lie.

As you say, two things need to be dealt with the RN and the RAF.  Let's start with the RN.  Assuming the German torpedoes weren't sh*te and Prien brought some friends along and the home fleet was all at Scapa Flow, that might be enough. Still have a crap tonne of destroyers and light units to deal with.  Bear in mind that even with local air dominance, Dunkirk happened - of course that can cut both ways.   Ok so home fleet is shattered at its mooring leaving heavy Kriegsmarine units to screen the flanks of the invasion force.

The RAF - well that was a close run thing anyway. Focus everything on the airfields, don't get sidetracked by revenge missions on civilians and yes the Germans could have done better than they did.  They would still have problems going deep strategically (interdiction of supplies and reinforcements) without a heavy bomber. 

Crete is a bit of a red herring being 6 months after the fact so I don't think Adolf would be gun shy about sending in the paras.  If you are looking at going in in late '41, the Home Guard becomes much less of a gendarmerie and much more of an integrated defense force. Most of them were youngish men in reserved occupations many of whom would have had combat experience form the First War or Spain - decidedly not Dad's Army.    Keeping the Yanks and their lend lease out of the picture becomes a priority.Maybe polio takes out Roosevelt leaving a more right win isolationist president in the Whitehouse. 

So keep it early.  Move the Gigant up a bit to provide a heavy supply glider. Couple that with previous German airlanding experience and yes they could get an airfield. However, they could also get spanked like they did in the Hague.  And as I recall, there were really only two air portable divisions available.  The real problem is that maintaining an airhead is very difficult as Stalingrad proved.   To move heavy stuff in bulk you need a port,

Well dinner is served and I am not cooking for once :)  so that's it from me for now.

Fenton

Didnt Churchill want to drop Anthrax on Berlin?

I am sure if it came to losing he would have authorised the use of gas
If I were creating Pendraken I wouldn't mess about with Romans and  Mongols  I would have started with Centurions , eight o'clock, Day One!

freddy326

I apologise now if I come across as a bit stroppy but I've seen too many Sealion threads that were purposely written so the Germans succeed.

So,out of curiosity which angle are you going to be looking at Sealion? What the actual capabilities and resources of both sides where or will you be loading the Germans to such a point that they can't possibly fail?

I quote the following from your email

'In order to succeed:

1. RAF needs to be moved out of the picture

The pressure must be upheld untill 11th Fightergroup is withdrawn north to conserve whatever strength is left.
-> This leaves airspace free to German Bombers, particularly the Ju87s to pinpoint and eliminate threats to both airpower and the invasion.

2. The Royal Navy must be occupied elsewhere'

what date would you be looking at staging the invasion? Straight after Dunkirk when the Germans had minimal amphibious units and even less experience or September(ish) when the British Army was certainly capable of resisting the landings??

regards

Freddy326


sebigboss79

17 December 2013, 10:17:40 AM #4 Last Edit: 17 December 2013, 10:25:30 AM by sebigboss79
Hi Freddy, hi PatG, Fenton and others.

I understand this is indeed is sensitive topic and me being German it sounds like sacrileg to pursue the idea this operation might have actually worked. I did not feel insulted at all by your comment and most of all there is a lot of merit in it. The idea is to leave the original order of battle intact as much as possible. And even if the Germans get "loaded" there is still a lot that can lead to their failure. So, no I am not deliberatly giving the Germans victory for any kind of purpose. I find the topic highly interesting and in general I am appalled at the level of stupidity across German High Command. I am interested in "what if" the Germans were only half as stupid and had an actual plan to pull this off?

As stated the window of opportunity is very small. You are also correct about the invasion fleet. The wake of a destoyer would have scuttled it.  Specialised invasion craft were actually built (for Sealion) and then used in the Baltic - without losses as my current source suggests. The fleet is somewhat a week point. It needs to get over fast and as much unseen as possible. Thus the initial assault must not only secure the beachhead, it must secure supply lines and flank the first line of defense. Whereas you are correct there was only 1 airborne Division but soldiers generally do not care how they ride into battle. Regular troops could be flown in via occupied airfields. Again these are light troops
and the beach assault needs to bring in the heavy stuff.

This highlights another weak point. The assault in Crete has shown aircrews with little regard to conservation of strength and equipment with some of them deliberately crashing their JU52s to get the paras into position. A Phyrric victory and not to mention that NOT invading Malta leaves Crete somewaht as a nobrainer. Again: Level of stupidity in the OKW.

Concerning airsupply and Stalingrad. I would argue that to be a bit different case. First of all the Soviets controlled airspace and the approaches to it and secondly the weather was particularly cold even for Soviet wintertime. There are examples that Luftwaffe was capable to airsupply an army if it had to and if it was given the means to do so. I think there are two examples one during France and the other during Barbarossa but I recall from memory I would certainly need to verify it. For Sealion we are talking about feasability and that is ONLY if Luftwaffe rules the sky.

Another good hint was the ME Gigant which became operational in November 1942. Even if it can be pulled forward a little, it was derived from the ME321 Glider, the JU52 is still the mainstay of the operation.

It is however important to understand that not even under the best preconditions Sealion becomes an "autowin". I think it was Raeder who told Hitler that the preconditions for Sealion would actually make the physical occupation of British soil unneccessary - again a bit of a strong statement for which I am looking for a reference.

Yes Churchill was very much advocating the use of poisonous gases long before WW2 and surprise surprise the Army stockpiled the stuff but never actually used it. The stockpile of Allied WMDs was quite low, certainly nothing Adolf could not have retaliated tenfold up untill 42 or even 43. I would need actual numbers. I am not aware of civilian defense preparations concerning gas warfare in either country. I know Gasmasks were not standard issue for German field troops. How ould the British Army distribute such amounts on short notice?

Let us stay at the gas issue for a moment. Imagine Churchill authorises such AND moreover the armed forces REALLY go ahead. Let us further consider the whole German invasion is eliminated by gas. We are in agreement this kills the soldiers and leaves a lot of equipment to the British. But it will not alter the whole strategic situation. Invasion is still feasible as all preconditions are met. Gas does not remove German air dominance and partial control of the sea (by air dominance).

Hence as the British escalate into gas warfare it is a possibility German Luftwaffe starts dropping Gas as well and with little to no RAF interference there is a bit of a boomerang here. Remember we are talking about Luftwaffe ruling the sky in the invasion area AND still control Reich airspace AND RAF being little to no threat.

Now the Homeguard. Much like the army it is at the beginning undermanned and underarmed at best. But so were the Germans. So while Britains defense was weak the German offense was virtually non-existent. Over time both Army and Homeguard become stronger and narrow the chances in an open fight. Focussing on the Homeguard I believe after the initial counter attack -and should it fail- the Homeguard would become a quasi military force. With knowledge of the area the Germans will have hell to pay for every advance. Do not underestimate the power of free men defending their own backyard. Even if the Homeguard fails to stop the Germans they will significantly delay them until the Army can mount a much stronger all out counter attack. I would go as far as saying that under these circumstances the German advantage in the field is nullified for the decisive battle. Whether an equal playing field will be enough for the British is another question. I would say it is an open match.

Again this would become a question if the Germans can resupply and replace casualties.

Concerning the lessons from Crete it is fact that Adolf used the paras only on tactical missions and in small scale thereafter. EG Mussolini or the "Feuerwehr" missions on the eastern front. The biggest issue was that not untill late the paras actually jumped with their weapons. At Crete they had small numbers of grenades and a pistol. Their rifles were dropped in marked canisters and they had to fight their way through to them. Moreover the British knew the invasion plan en detail so could concentrate their strenght and surprise still lost besides knowing everything AND having higher numbers. The problem here was communication (for both sides actually).

But again as freddy pointed out the timing is crucial! Too early and the Germans drown on approach. Too late and the British stand more than a fair chance to resist and actually win in the field.

And again my plea: Do not make political statements highlighting how bad the Germans are or were. The qualities of either side are not part of the topic. Topic is how can this succeed and I do understand odds need to be pushed quite significantly. And that is the point I am talking. We know X needs to happen so we can find out Y preconditions and then decide whether this was workable or not. Thanks again for the input. I am at National Library to get more data.

freddy326

Hi,

It's not sensitive to me at all, it's the 'one-what if' i really want to game! But,I just don't get why the realities are ignored.

My Grandfather was a Lieutenant in the Rochford Home Guard which is in Essex and he always said that if the landings had taken place in 1940 then their chances of survival were pretty limited, but by 1941 they were well trained and equipped.

forget the JU52s and Crete, how many were lost during the invasion of Holland? did they have enough left to drop an airborne division? remember as well that even one lost, with it's crew over Britain, diminishes the resupply capabilities.

you could look at the option of recreating the Norway model and use destroyers and cruisers to transport the first wave, that would give the RAF and light strike force the problem of dealing with the Kriegsmarine while the Luftwaffe fly's top cover

for what it's worth I think that given luck...and I mean a lot of luck...the Germans may have got ashore but not much further.

regards

Freddy326

sebigboss79

good idea freddy :D

I am also interested in the Sandhurst Wargames. They concluded beating the Germans at the GHQ line BUT assume the Germans would NOT have airdominance and zero resupply after day 5! Now replay the Sandhurst wargames but give the Germans dominance of the sky... :-\

What I certainly cannot fathom is ridiculing the idea of invasion as "improvisation". It has, as you said, worked quite well in Norway and the germans were mere hours before the Brits staged the same stunt.

I do not wish to insult or contradict your ancestry but "being ready for the Huns" means facing 25 battle hardened divisions that have been under fire in Poland, Norway and France. How many outfits of the British army had been blooded? Only those that got bloody noses in Dunkirk. We are in agreement that the longer the invasion is postponed the better the British fighting chances become. Hence my saying that the advantage of the Germans is closing similarily with the window of opportunity.

In total not only I am facepalming at the stupidity in OKW but also at the options that are contemplated. I am following the trail of an invasion not being necessary after controlling the air and submarines basically halting commerce. I think this would be the best chance the germans have to come to an agreement with the British. The threat of invasion or at most a limited assault just to show they can would only be the final stages of an otherwise successful western campaign.

freddy326

I'm sure I didn't say Home Guard were ready in 1940, far from it in fact! They wouldn't have faced 25 divisions, maybe not even one full division but it doesn't mean that the HG would have faired any better. The HG weren't expected to stop the invasion, the best that could be hoped for would be for them to have slowed down the landings so that regulars could be bought up, assuming that the stop lines weren't finished. I've read somewhere that GB created something like 100 battalions between June and October and they were equipped.

'give the Germans dominance of the sky' You may as well then say that the Germans have control of the Channel, the seas stay calm (I've done a lot of scuba diving in the Channel) and wouldn't want to be in the middle in a flat bottom boat (sounds like a song!) even in summer!

no, not improvisation, but unlikely with the logistics that OKW had available.

The only time that 11 Group was starting to look a bit ropey was late July/August, pilot losses were outstripping replacements. By September they have started to recover and have more pilots and aircraft than before BOB whilst the Luftwaffe strength is declining. If I remember correctly 11Group would have retired to 12Group in the event of invasion. It's not easy for the Luftwaffe to get at them there.

How many barges were available for the Kriegsmarine? bear in mind that these barges were in use moving cargo around the Low Countries and Germany including to and from armaments factories, so unless they build a lot more then OKW could have ended up destablising their own industry.

Of course the other snag is how many destroyers and cruisers were left in the Kriegsmarine after Norway?

regards

Freddy326

OldenBUA

Regarding airborne attacks, especially on airfields. Forget about it. It's simply not possible (anymore).

There were 430 JU-52 available for the airlandings around the Hague, in May '40. Of these, 280 were destroyed and/or damaged beyond repair. Not only this, but many crews were supplied by the training schools. These losses were felt for a very long time/for the rest of the war.

Also, with regards to "German paratroopers were a crack outfit, highly motivated and particularly indoctrinated. Thus they fight and die." In May '40 around 400 paratroopers were KIA around the Hague. Another 1600 or so were made prisoner, with 1200 being shipped (just in time) to the UK. So I would suggest that maybe they are human after all, and not all-conquering supermen.
Water is indeed the essential ingredient of life, because without water you can't make coffee!

Aander lu bin óók lu.

Fenton

I have no idea of the answer, so its just a random question really in regards to invasion

If a planned assault had happened in the UK, what role would 5th columnists and German spies played in disrupting British defences etc. Would they have made any impact?
If I were creating Pendraken I wouldn't mess about with Romans and  Mongols  I would have started with Centurions , eight o'clock, Day One!

freddy326

Good question! MI-5 did manage to apprehend most if not all the German agents, but I haven't read anything that proves or disproves there were any left who hadn't given up, been turned or imprisoned. But IRA with German support, now that's different!!

according to the fountain of all knowledge aka Wikipedia

'During the Second World War, the IRA leadership hoped for support from Germany to strike against Britain during the war, and Seán Russell travelled to Germany in 1940 to canvass for arms. He became ill and died on board a German U-boat which was bringing him back to Ireland in August that year along with Frank Ryan (see Operation Dove). Stephen Hayes, the acting Chief of Staff, prepared an invasion plan for Northern Ireland and sent it to German Intelligence in 1940; this plan was later called Plan Kathleen, but it was discovered by the Irish authorities within one month of its creation.'

and

'IRA Abwehr involvement throughout the period can be broken up into three phases:
Coordination missions with the IRA preceding the French campaign,
Military missions directed against Britain for the purposes of gathering technical and weather data
Political missions against Britain undertaken later in the war, when the threat of direct German action against Britain had receded.'

regards

Freddy326


Ithoriel

Since the German spies had by and large been turned by the British they may well have been used to spread misinformation to the Germans.

Worry about 5th columnist activity might have been more disruptive than any actual fifth columnist activity.

Biggest threat would have come from the substantial number of Brits, from government circles down, who believed the Germans would win the war. Was it Sun Tzu who said that the most successful war is the one you win without fighting it?
There are 100 types of people in the world, those who understand binary and those who can work from incomplete data

sebigboss79

17 December 2013, 01:27:38 PM #12 Last Edit: 17 December 2013, 01:52:21 PM by sebigboss79
Hi all and thanks for another round of input. There have been other interesting developments as well in my research.

@freddy: No it was me who said they were a force to reckon with. If not initially then over time. The 25 divisions were not only the initial German plan but also the backup plan if the amended 9-15 divisions for the assault would not suffice.

Mark you I said initial plan. At the beginning of the threat GB had 26 field divisions no armour and artillery to mention and most of these troops were not armed fully or at all. But then again this was the time when Germany was not in the position to cross the channel.

Furthermore the Luftwaffe does not need to get to 11th Group. They just need to fly cover for the army and the fleet. If 11th Group or Bomber Command shows up, then there will be a fight.

The number of transport was exceeding the needed + 10% margin by about another 10%. Full figures vary to some extent but in all publications transport is sufficient.

The German fleet was non existent after Norway. Even if you count in all captured vessels, T/S/E Boats we get less than 100 craft available for this (in addition to the invasion fleet). Now with 10 – 20 equipped soldiers per load and each trip 2hours one way we get 1000 – 2000 soldiers and 3 trips. That assumes no opposition from RN. More about RN later.


@OldenBUA: The number of JU52s available for S day (Sptember 15th) was 252 not counting those under maintenance and repair. That means another 252 * 15 * 3 = 11,000 troops ferried across. Per day! Now assuming 10 % losses that would surely go down to about 7 – 8,000 soldiers. Still a considerable force. For simplicitys sake let's say 5,000 a day for 5 days and after that 2,000 plus supplies. That makes S+4 = 20,000 (initial counter attack) and S+10: 35,000 airlifted troops alone. Assuming high casualties (30%+) we count more than 20,000 still.

Paratroopers were certainly not superhuman but recalling Crete they were outnumbered and against an enemy that knew all their moves. Yet they prevailed. I find that quite impressive


@all: German intelligence is throughout the war ineffective. The only positive experience was Norway. It went so far that Canaris secretly kept the British informed and apparently said to his contact in Portugal as early as 1939 that Germany will lose the war.

Concerning the Sandhurst Wargame:

I have now learned that the umpires were not classroom generals but experienced soldiers from both sides. Cutting it short the only criticism remaining is the preconditions for the exercise. To assume the Germans would proceed despite RAF controlling the sky (yes I believe RAF on their own turf is in control) is equal to replaying this exercise and removing all British Units. It simply makes no sense. Despite the odds the initial force manages to move up to the GHQ line and is not simply defeated but starved and THEN defeated.

Let us assume the OKW was so thick as to try against such opposition. Ithoriel mentions the opportunism of British officials siding with the Germans. None of such is mentioned in the Sandhurst Wargame!

I find it quite possible SOME collaboration and appeasement would play a role should the Germans establish beachheads not to mention starting to move landside. In all publications I recently read an initial attack on the beachheads is repulsed at S+3 or S+4. It will take some days to organise a counter attack and then it may or may not succeed. Now let us imagine it really fails (as per Sandhurst) what would happen on the political front. Churchill would pay a terrible political price. Would politicians just stand by or would at least SOME of them attempt to save their own selfs? How would this destabilize politics and in effect the armed forces? Loads of questions but to assume this to go only one direction is a bit narrowing the options. There will always be opportunism to some degree.

D-Day has given us the lesson that enemy troops, once ashore, are near impossible to kick out again. Even more so if the assault is backed up by airpower. Again the major flaw in the Sandhurst Wargame.

Concerning RN: Even if the minefields, submarines and other measure would keep the Homefleet away (Quote Ruge: Some always get through) then RN has about 20 - 40 destroyers available already in the theatre plus S/E Boats and MTBs. I conclude RN cannot be removed as a factor. Can it be controlled? Perhaps. The idea to assault the harbours from air and sea comes to mind. The minefields would surely keep anything stationed in Portsmouth out for a while and the question is how fast can Portsmouth be taken. According to Cox S+10 German troops are planned to be outside London, controlling Portsmout and most of Southern England. Again a direct assault on Portsmouth, Dover and Folkestone is mandatory. With the exception of Portsmout this can be a combined sea/air invasion. Portsmouth must be taken with troops landing nearby and paras concerting that. Then and only then Southern England becomes a German play area. Quite a task but the mind rises up to the challenge.

Another problem for any kind of assault: Once it starts the British know about it and will give out "Cromwell". I assume this is factored in by Sandhurst and I am impressed that the Germans get as far as the GHQ line with a more than inadequate plan.

As of now the best option I can see is an assault end of winter 1940/41 with the ME321 available carrying 200 soldiers or a tank.

Tentative Timeline (ideal sebigboss scenario):

3am: initial para landings. Securing airfield(s) and strategic points
4am: British start mobilising. Cromwell is given out. (is that too fast?)
5am: All beaches fully manned. Initial contact with Paras
6am: Airfields in control of Paras, Airlift starting
6am: Assault on beaches. British in position. Initial (uncoordinated) counter attack on Paras fails.
10am minor ports under German control. Sealift shifting to equipment.
2pm: initial counterattack (again uncoordinated) fails
5pm: Dover out of action but under German control

S+3 Initial Coordinated counterattack faces stiff German resistance. Armour and Artillery support on both sides equal.
S+4 Dover reopened. RN arrives facing Luftwaffe operating from British bases, submarines and minefields as well as numerous smaller crafts. RN controls the night, Luftwaffe the day with smaller RN craft running interference raids. Channel is dominated by German airpower and artillery.
S+5 Coordinated resistance fades as British units withdraw. Germans maintain perimeter.
S+7/9 Germans break out of perimeter.


I admit being guided by the book "If Britain had fallen" and my suggested timeline (if all goes well) is still tentative. What I need is some more information and unfortunately when I had the books available at National Library a firealarm ended my day there :(

freddy326

Sorry, but Overlord had a couple of things going in it's favour that Sealion didn't

1)The Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 had behind it two years of planning, the Germans would have had around two months. Even allowing for the improvisational skills of some German generals, this would seem to be a tough task to get it right.

2) When launching 'Overlord', the Allies had established supremacy both in the air and at sea. The Germans, on the other hand, failed at one and had no chance at the other.

3) The Allies had developed a considerable array of specialist vehicles, landing craft etc. to carry men and equipment as safely as possible onto the invasion beaches. The Germans, on the other hand, would be relying on river barges, most of which would have been towed.

4) For all their material superiority the Allied commanders recognised that there was still a good chance that 'Overlord' would fail incurring heavy losses of men and equipment. Again, the Germans could barely hope for such superiority, so how much more likely would it have been that 'Sealion' would have been a costly failure?

Fuel for the JU-52s and their air cover? you can't move it by barge, you've nicked all of those for your troops!

'Furthermore the Luftwaffe does not need to get to 11th Group. They just need to fly cover for the army and the fleet. If 11th Group or Bomber Command shows up, then there will be a fight.'......and what would the cost to the Germans have been? don't forget that this is the critical period when the Germans would have been attempting to expand their bridgehead(s), bring in armour and heavy artillery that it wasn't possible to land in the first wave. Sorry, but German resources were such that no arm of the Wehrmacht was capable of performing all the tasks required of it to stage a successful invasion.

If I recall correctly several members of the establishment who were pro-German were quietly moved out of the way. To name but a few, the Mosleys were interned in May/June and  1940, John Amery was in Vichy France but didn't get to Berlin until 1942, Lord Halifax was appeasement rather than collaboration.

It's very difficult to capture a functioning port, the allies tried it a couple of times ! You'd need to try and take Dover and Folkestone as they the only ones that the Luftwaffe can realisticly provide fighter cover for.

I remember something about the Germans testing landing troops from river barges on the french coast and finding them unsuitable, but I can't remember were it was.

I have shamelessly grabbed this off another Sealion site as I'm at worked and can't hunt down the info

The "County Divisions" (little transport) were placed to cover the coast and the ports, the refitting regular divisions and the GHQ reserve divisions which were fully mobile.

'In July, according to Hamilton and the official war records, England had the following troops in the southeast in July:

1st London Div - Dover, Folkstone, Deal
45th Division - Rye, Pevensey
3rd Division - Worthing, Brighton
New Zealand - Reigate, Crawley

These first three divisions were either without significant transport or only partially mobile, the NZ was fully mobile (and actually, more properly part of the GHQ reserve but probably the first responders.

The GHQ Reserve in July consisted of the following divisions (west of London, Oxforshire, Wiltshire):

1st Arm'd Div (Cruisers and Matilda IIs)
2nd Arm'd Div (Cruisers, Lt tanks and Valentines)
1st Canadian
2nd London
43rd Wessex
52nd Lowland

plus an Australian division just arrived near Bristol'

it still all boils down to when you're going to invade though!

regards

Freddy326

OldenBUA

Quote from: sebigboss79 on 17 December 2013, 01:27:38 PM
3am: initial para landings. Securing airfield(s) and strategic points
...
6am: Airfields in control of Paras, Airlift starting

The German airforce lost so many transport planes in the attack on the Hague airfields because they used a similar plan. The only problem being that some airfields were not captured (or were lost to a counterattack) when the second wave was due to land. So any kind of setback in this first phase, and your 10% losses in transport seem very, very low. And 250 planes is simply not enough, if next to twice that amount was used four months earlier. Because it seems to me that your plan involves far more objectives as well.

The basic problem (which will be much worse in Sealion) is that you're putting limited numbers of troops right in the middle of enemy territory. Ever since Norway, there are no undefended airfields anymore. And, it's not just the garrison, any/all troops in the vicinity will get involved as well.

If you want airdrops to work, you need a massive amount of them, several divisions worth, all in one go. The German army/airforce simply did not have this capability.
Water is indeed the essential ingredient of life, because without water you can't make coffee!

Aander lu bin óók lu.