What are you currently reading ?

[kipt]

Finished "Contrasts in Command: The battle of Fair Oaks, May 31-June 1, 1862" by Victor Vignola.  As the author says, there is not much written about this battle of the ACW (also known as Seven Pines).  This was part of the Seven days where McClellan had taken the Army of the Potomac and landed south of Richmond.

General Johnson was in command and finally decided he needed to do something as the Federals were within 20 miles of Richmond.  His plan was a good one, to outflank the Union III Corps on its right flank.  This involved 3 divisions with Longstreet in command of the attack.

It did not work as Longstreet did not follow his orders (speculation that he wanted to do his own thing).  DH Hill attacked the left of the III Corps at Seven Pines (a mile to the southeast of Fair Oaks) and pushed the Yankees back quite far.  However, the right flank attack did not work as the Union was able to get reinforcements there and slaughter the Rebels.  Longstreet's division really did not get into action, taking a road that was supposed to be for General Huger.

So generally a well written book but quite a few repetitive passages.  Longstreet and Johnson get criticized for what has been called a misunderstanding or an honest mistake.  Several high ranking Confederate officers took exception to the "cover-up" by Longstreet and Johnson and the blaming of Huger for the failure of the attack. Later Union officers said that if Johnson's plan had gone as he intended, the II Corps would have been in serious trouble and McClellan would have had to pull beck.  Johnson did not command, Longstreet did not communicate nor did the command at the battle.

The one good thing to come from the action was the wounding of Johnson (not for him) and his replacement by R.E. Lee.

So, good description of the two fights (not quite simultaneous) and an interesting appendix on the "misunderstanding".

[kipt]

Finished "Unbroken; A World War II Story of Survival, Resilience, and Redemption", by Laura Hillenbrand.  She is also the author of "Seabiscuit".  It is the story of Lt Louie Zamperini, a rebellious youth that took up running and was in the 1936 Olympics.

He became a bombardier in B-24's in the Pacific.  His plane crashed in the Pacific and only 3 survived the crash.  After many weeks in a life raft two came to an island and were captured by the Japanese.  This is the story of his capture, torture, survival and eventually return to the US.

This was made into a movie by Angelina Jolie in 2014..

[kipt]

Finished "The Waterloo archive, Volume X: British Sources.  Edited by Garath Glover.  Different sources in this book: a pair of travelers after Waterloo to the battlefield with some pretty good sketches.  A copy of the order book of the 5th Division (which is pretty mundane - listing which brigade has guard duty over and over again.  Only the first 15 of several hundred entries).

More interesting are the Letter Books of Major William Tylden, Royal Engineers Pontoon Train.  Shortages, travels, court marshals promotions, murders, stolen horses and inattention to requited reports by officers.

[kipt]

Finished an Osprey, "Landing Craft, Infantry And Fire Support" by Gordon L Rottman, illustrated by Peter Bull.

Typical Osprey but more interesting than I thought it would be,  Amazing how many different types were produced.

[kipt]

Finished an outstanding book "Wellington's Waterloo Allies: How Soldiers From Brunswick, Hanover, Nassau And The Netherlands Contributed To The Victory Of 1815" by Andrew W. Field.  This is a book that people interested in the horse and musket era, and rules writers for the same should read.

It is very analytical on what it takes for units to fight effectively.  His first chapter is Military Effectiveness. He discusses Manpower, Organization, Equipment and Arms, Logistics, Drill and Training, Leadership, Discipline, Ethos, Support for the cause, Experience, Courage and Morale and Battlefield Performance.  Then he discusses "What does the level of casualties tell us?", the Missing, Inexperienced troops and Wellington's Maximizing utility through the use of British officers (where he could) and mixing troops.

Young soldiers, newly formed, first time in combat, with NCO's and officers the troops did not necessarily know could not be expected to perform as well as veterans or long service troops.  This book is how Wellington used these allied contingents to get the best out of them.  Each following chapter is on each of the contingents and is very tactical and detailed.  While many authors have followed the extant British view that their allies all ran away or were no good, this book dispels that notion.

Thinking of the Regimental Fire and Fury rule-set that I really like, RFF embodies extremely well the low level nitty-gritty action of units that this book presents.

I heartily recommend this book for its views on combat, for a good presentation of the allies fight at Waterloo, and its very clear writing.  5 stars in my mind.

[fsn]

Comprehensive. Fascinating. 

[kipt]

Finished "The Enemy's House Divided" by Charles de Gaulle, translated and annotated by Robert Eder.  This book evidently was started (for ideas) while de Gaulle was a prisoner of the Germans in WWI.

IN it, de Gaulle tells what, in his mind, caused the Germans to lose WWI: The disobedience of General von Kluck, the declaration of unlimited submarine warfare, the relationship with their allies, the fall of Chancellor Bethmann=Hollweg and the debacle of the German people (lied to, disillusioned when the Entente attacked when told they could not).

The workings of an exceptional mind.

[kipt]

Finished "The Great Partnership: Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson and the Fate of the confederacy", by Christian B. Keller.
This book is how Jackson complemented Lee's command style (after showing what Jackson could accomplish after the Seven days where he performed miserably, probably due to exhaustion).  Both professional soldiers, both aggressive and attack minded, they also shared a deep religious faith, which according to this author made them close friends (quite a bit about the religion here).

Longstreet doesn't get great reviews here, and after Jackson's death, neither Ewell nor A.P. Hill had time to get fully accustomed to Lee's style of generalship and risk taking.  Both were division commanders under Jackson, but Ewell was heavily wounded and out for some time and Hill was not in Jackson's good graces.

A telling sentence in the book is "Part of the onus here might rightly fall on Old Jack, who had had opportunities to counsel and mentor both men under his command at different times, but chose not to,..."

The Appendix is titled "Insights on Leadership Drawn from The Lee-Jackson Partnership".  A good summary of what benefits accrued from the partnership.

[kipt]

Finished "Mapping The First world War: The great War Through Maps From 1014 To 1918" by RPeter Chasseaud.

This book is a condensed history of the war, essentially on all fronts, including naval, and supported by very interesting maps.  The maps are from the Western allies and also form the German, Austrian, Ottoman side.

There are maps showing the front layouts (both east, west and the Middle East, as well as trench maps, bombardment maps and propaganda maps.

Large scale book and very well illustrated.

[kipt]

Finished Vol. 88, No. 1 of "The Journal of Military History".
Articles include:

The Jagiellonian Trail: The Organization of the Units of the Kingdom of Poland during the Prussian
War (1519-1521).
Learning From Foreigners" U.S. Army Medical Experiences in WWI.
The Rhineland Catalyst: British Colonialism and the Development of U.S. strategies for Military Occupation after World War I.
The Infantry's "Problem of Quality": Classification and Assignment to MOS 745, Rifleman, 1942-1945.
and others.

Also 102 pages of book reviews.  Often a place I see books I want.

[fsn]

I was very happy to receive an Amazon gift voucher for my birthday ... which I splashed out on this ...


Wow! 528 pages in a very heavy volume. Lots of pretty pictures, and everything you could want to know about the Westphalian army ... and a whole lot more. For example, officers of the Field Postal Service could happily be extras on the poop deck of a Hornblower set. 

Not a book I'd have bought with my own money, but a comprehensive and weighty tome. 

[kipt]

Finished "The Myth And Reality Of German Warfare: Operational Thinking From Moltke The elder To Heusinger" by COL Gerhard P. Gross and translated by MG David T. Zabecki.

The book has examples from 1866 into the Cold War (where the Germans had to realize a different solution to the problem of defense).  The General Staff recognized Germany could only win a war where surrounded on both sides was by aggressive, offensive attack.  The Schleiffen plan of fighting France first and then Russia was based on the idea of Russia being slow and backward (from the Russo-Japanese War).  But in WWI the speed of attack was held to the marching power of the troops and horses. The vast Russian area was not considered as the Germans had figured on winning a war near the German border.

During the interwar years, the tanks, airplanes and motorized vehicles gave some of the
General Staff the idea that the speed problem had been solved.  However, as the invasion of
Russia proceeded, only 16 divisions were motorized out of 160+, so 10%.  The panzers were held back by the walking infantry (and there were more horses in the German army in WWII than WWI).

The General Staff felt that once war started, politics should not be involved.  Theoretically in WWI the Kaiser should have been able to control the different military departments (the Army, the War Ministry, the department that supplied manpower and equipment) but he was not able to. And, those departments did not talk to each other.  The Staff recognized the need for a quick war and failed.  Logistics was ignored (a posting to logistics was considered a black mark for an officer).

Hitler wanted to capture areas that could support the Reich (grain, oil) while the Staff only considered operations that eliminated the enemy.

So, Attack, ignore logistics, ignore politics (how do you end a war with no overall strategy other than winning all the battles - the US has been accused of this lately), ignore strategy, be an insular clique of a professional army, ignoring any outside factors.  Did not work twice, even though the tactics have been extensively studied by the Western powers.

A deep book, similar to reading Clausewitz in my mind.

[kipt]

And another Osprey "British Frigates And Escort Destroyers 1939-45" by Angus Konstam and illustrated by Adam Tooby.

Probably won't have many of these ships for my naval battles.  Although I may try some convoy/submarine actions at some point. 
So its always good to see the specs for the different ships.

[paulr]

I'm interested in how you handle the limited knowledge each side should have in convoy/submarine actions

[kipt]

I haven't done any yet.  Long time ago our group did a campaign on a map for the northern convoys to Russia.  Meetings occurred on the map and transferred to the board.  We fought the Luftwaffe, U-Boats and Kriegsmarine.  The map movement was done by both sides and the umpire brought us together.

U-Boats firing into a convoy always hit something.